

Carlisle P. Runge Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 5/22/1971
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Biographical Note

Carlisle P. Runge (1920-1983) was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower from 1961 to 1962. This interview focuses on the 1960 Democratic primary in Wisconsin, the internal operations of the Defense Department under Robert S. McNamara, and the relations between the military and the Defense Department, among other topics.

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Sally Runge

February 28, 1986
Date

James S. Bundy
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April 14, 1986
Date

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Oral History Interview

with

CARLISLE P. RUNGE

May 22, 1971
Madison, Wisconsin

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Mr. Runge, let's begin by my asking you to record for future historians exactly who you are. Who is this man who is giving us the story? What are your ideas, your background, your perceptions, your biases and so on, as you see them?

RUNGE: Well, I'm pleased to attempt to provide a survey biography for background purposes. As you know, currently I am a member of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, and that represents perhaps the essence of my biographical sketch. I was born in this state in a small town, the son of a dentist, in Seymour, Wisconsin, which incidentally is Outagamie County, and that is another element later on. But perhaps most importantly, because I think there is something to be said for a social heritage, my forebearers were German '48er liberals that came to this state from Germany in the 1848 period. I think the first generation was busy enough hacking out a living in the quasi-frontier area not to have left any particular community or political mark. But my grandfather's generation represented the rather distinct recognized level of participation in public affairs. My grandfather, also a dentist like my father, was sometime mayor of Sheboygan and active oh, I suppose in roughly the mid-1880's to the early 1900s in the liberal movements in the state, first as a Democrat, then as a Populist, later as a [Robert M.] LaFollette Progressive, and then in later years--not in that generation but in our generation--back again to the Democratic fold. His brother, my great-uncle, was a lawyer, a graduate of this law school, 1886--the University of Wisconsin--a successful political lawyer, city attorney in Milwaukee, judge in Milwaukee for many years, and was actually the member of that generation that I, an active, hard-driving, aggressive, no-quarter German liberal who went through the same series of political affiliations that his brother, my grandfather did. My father, in turn, a professional man in a small town, married to my mother who represented the small-town local establishment--lumber people, of all things--none

the less continued the family faith. I grew up in the twenties and thirties in a household in which the name LaFollette was next to God. My father was never anything other than a local office-holder, but a part of that band of upper middle-class people in the state that were the stalwarts of the Progressive LaFollette movement, in terms of local activity, participation in party affairs, contributions and all that went on. I was urged not too subtly by my father to attend the University of Wisconsin, which I did. I came here as an undergraduate in 1938 which, incidentally, was the year that [Philip F.] Phil LaFollette was rejected in his bid for a fourth term as governor. My undergraduate years were not distinguished academically, but active as hell in the usual range of student affairs. I must say that both my undergraduate classmates and the faculty of that period were very influential. I say classmates because in that period--and this has changed somewhat but not materially--you tended to have the better students from every small town in this state coming to Madison as an undergraduate. People like [Robert] Bob Lampman, now of our Economics Department, one of the authorities on income maintenance, poverty problems, was a close friend and undergraduate classmate; [David H.] Dave Susskind, represented not the Wisconsin input, but the sophisticated eastern non-resident student, was a classmate; [Nathan S.] Nat Heffernan, now on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was another; [Robert G.] Bob Lewis, who was active in the Kennedy administration Department of Agriculture, another classmate, editor of the Daily Cardinal, the student newspaper. So it was an exciting undergraduate experience, both in terms of the kind of people I've mentioned, and a very distinguished faculty that represented the Wisconsin idea of education. The essence of that was that the academic community have strong ties with the state and the state's problems, and participate directly and indirectly in the state's government. In many respects, I think I had an all-star faculty association: people like [Edwin E.] Ed Witte, professor of economics and political science, perhaps best-known for his work in the John R. Commons tradition--he had been a student of Commons--as the principal draftsman of the social security legislation in the New Deal; [Selig] Perlman, the labor historian; John Gaus, political science, later at Harvard; John Hicks, later a dean of the graduate school at Berkeley [University of California, Berkeley], professor of American history. My own major was American institutions, which allowed me to cross departments into economics, political science and history or law school. And I took an undergraduate course then that was headed by Lloyd Garrison. So that, naming just those four or five faculty members I think gives one who understands the history of intellectual liberalism a feel of the kind of magnificent exposure that we had to some of the very best in the academic world, and who had in their own way made a distinct contribution, first, to the state government in Wisconsin in their association with the LaFollettes, and later, to the New Deal. Well, I left the

university in the spring of '42 with a degree and, at that moment more importantly, a commission. I served on active duty for the next four years with two of those years being in Europe: first in England, and then in France and Germany commanding a unit in Third Army. Well, I returned in '46--to go to law school here; I graduated in '48. And that fall of '46 when we returned from the wars was the year that Bob LaFollette came up for re-election in Wisconsin. And some of us who were friendly to the LaFollettes in fact stayed with Bob in his aborted effort to become, or to once again become a Republican. Appreciate that the LaFollette third party, the Progressive party, had been abandoned that spring. Sad day. I was at the meeting in Portage, where the decision was made to disband.

MOSS: Let me back up just a moment. I have here, in 1945 you were at Oxford University, were you not?

RUNGE: Yes.

MOSS: Does that enter into it at all?

RUNGE: Modestly, because. . . . Yes, at the end of the war I found out about--having been in England on leave--the army's program to send people to Oxford or to send people to universities all over the U.K. [United Kingdom] and the continent. So I spent a term in England at Oxford, New College. My tutor was [Alan L.] Bullock, the European historian who is now, I understand, vice-chancellor, which is the active head of Oxford--a very able man. And I think certainly Bullock was an influence to give me a more sophisticated appreciation of European affairs, and really, I think, did much to--if I hadn't already learned it--offset what tended to be a kind of insular and traditional political isolationist position as Wisconsin liberals. And just by chance, my very dear friend Leon Epstein, who had been an undergraduate with me here at Wisconsin, was the other Wisconsin person in that package. Epstein has been dean of the College of Letters and Science at the university, and you as a political scientist know better than I his standing in the academic profession. He was at Queens [College] and I was at New College. And one must admit that there was as much social activity as there was academic activity in that period. But even the social activity was formative and worthwhile because the British Rhodes scholars, who had been off in active duty during the war, were back in residence. So that we had South African, Canadian, Australian contemporaries as well as people from the U.K. So that to that extent, yes, I think this at least, as I suggest, rounded out my appreciation of the world and post-war problems.

MOSS: So back to '46, then.

RUNGE: Well, yes. So we went. . . . I was talking about

Bob LaFollette's campaign which, as we all know, he lost to [Joseph R.] Joe McCarthy. This is why I said my place of birth had some relevance. Joe McCarthy was from Outagamie County, Appleton being the county seat. Law school years. . . . And when I left law school, I was very fortunate in being appointed assistant United States attorney for the western district of Wisconsin, following [James E.] Jim Doyle, now the United States district judge, who had come back to that position after having served in the [Franklin D.] Roosevelt years and the [Harry S.] Truman years. I think Jim's last Washington assignment had been as a special assistant to Mr. [James F.] Byrnes when he was secretary of state. At any rate, I followed Doyle into the United States attorney's office and served three years there, with the varied civil and criminal assignments of being a small and essentially a sleepy office. But it allowed me to get a firsthand working appreciation of a substantial portion of the state, because our district runs from the southern border all the way to the Lake Superior area in the western half of the state. Following that three-year hitch--which saw the re-election of Mr. Truman, of course, in '48--I joined the law faculty in 1951. I was almost tempted to press my military and quasi-military interests by joining the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], but on reflection I decided not to and went to the law faculty.

MOSS: Was the change of administration an occasion for your leaving?

RUNGE: No, because I left in '51 really before the last year and a half of the Truman administration. Though I must say that . . .

MOSS: Were you anticipating any of this?

RUNGE: . . . the handwriting was on the wall, that in all likelihood the Democrats would not prevail. I suppose that that appointment--you see, having been close to the LaFollettes, and the Democratic party in Wisconsin going through a reformation and kind of struggle to establish itself--sort of cemented me formally and officially into the Democratic ranks. But '51 leads to '52, and this was the re-run on the McCarthy affair. I was a young assistant professor in the law school. And this, I think, speaks well for the long-term traditions of the institution. I was quite prepared, and no one in any way challenged my taking an active political part in the '52 campaign. My particular part took the form of heading a committee that published a little booklet--Reader's Digest format--called The McCarthy Record, which, as political pamphleteering go, was eminently successful. And this committee--there were only seven or eight of us--was made up of several substantial senior citizens of the state: a man like Clough Gates of Superior, longtime LaFollette Progressive, university regent; a Miss

[Ruth] Jefferies of Janesville, who is part of one of Wisconsin's very distinguished old-line conservative families. Then there were a few who were younger: men like Norman Clapp, later REA [Rural Electrification Administration] administrator in the Kennedy-[Lyndon B.]Johnson administrations; John Wickhem, son of the distinguished Supreme Court justice, law school classmate. It was up to this group working with Miles McMillin, now publisher of the [Madison] Capitol Times, an old-line LaFollettite, and Morris Rubin, the editor of the Progressive, which had been the LaFollette family house organ, to turn out this book. McMillin and Rubin did most of the writing, the rest of us having the editorial role and political responsibility for the effort. We in turn enlisted seventy-five or eighty first rate people of both parties--or in those days, all three parties in Wisconsin--to endorse this publication. And what it was was an expose of Joe McCarthy's public life. It was published serially in the Milwaukee Journal, local Capital Times, the Sheboygan Press, an old-line Democratic paper. We sold a hundred thousand copies of it at a dollar a piece all around the country but a lot of them in Wisconsin and more were given away. It was part of the concerted campaign against Joe. My friend and former boss, [Thomas E.] Tom Fairchild, who had been United States attorney in my last year, was the Democratic candidate against McCarthy. Tom is a fine, distinguished, scholarly lawyer who had been attorney general and United States attorney; he'd been an old-line Progressive and, of course, now--then--a Democrat. Tom, in many respects, was not the best of candidates in that he didn't have the real flair, didn't have the charisma that was probably needed to unseat McCarthy. On the other hand, in terms of inherent quality, there was no better man available in the state. The interesting part of that campaign as we know was that Joe, because of the fire that was turned on him, ran at the bottom of the ticket. And, but for Mr. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower's embracement of McCarthy in the campaign, I think we might have beaten him.

MOSS: What sort of things was the McCarthy camp doing to counter this?

RUNGE: The McCarthy campaign--and I think this was probably Joe's own gut feeling--was not to attack; it was essentially to ignore. McCarthy was skillful enough to know that one could find some poor devil with an Ivy League background that you could find, that you could tar with some kind of Leftist association, or question his morals, and get by with it in Wisconsin. He was foxy enough to realize that the kind of people we had stacked against him in the local scene were not subject to that kind of attack, and if he had tried it, his whole case would have blown up.

MOSS: Yet he went after Philleo Nash pretty carefully.

RUNGE: Yes, he did. You're right about that. But Philleo, you see, had had enough of his career far enough away from Wisconsin Rapids and Wood County where he hailed from, to be able to make some of that stick. And one of the reasons that I was selected as chairman of that committee was that while I did not have a war hero's record by any means, I had an impeccable military record, and had served in the Justice Department, albeit locally, and was not the sort of person--nor was John Wickham, for example, nor Norman Clapp none of us were the kind of people, you see--that he could apply his techniques.

MOSS: You were not vulnerable.

RUNGE: Not vulnerable. So that we came out of that personally unscathed. Except that the one part of it that troubled me was that my mother had been a widow living in this little hometown of Seymour, suffered a fair amount of social pressure. I was viewed in my hometown and home parts as having become a Madison pinko, in the parlance of the time, and the . . .

MOSS: I know exactly what you're talking about. My father went through exactly the same thing down in Williamsburg [Virginia]. I can recall at one point somebody saying to my mother in the supermarket after it was all gone, "Oh, we can talk to you now. You're no longer controversial."

RUNGE: And this was difficult for an elderly, sensitive lady who, after all, had grown up in that town and whose family owned a good portion of it--you know, as I say, small town establishment--to be subjected to this kind of social pressure and vindictiveness. The editor of the hometown newspaper--he'd been a high school classmate of mine--was exactly the kind that you would expect to be a standard bearer in the McCarthy movement, a kind of homegrown neo-Fascist. And so that, well, in Madison, I personally received nothing but plaudits in a sense, for my role. I saw what happens in a small town when they can get at an isolated person, and having been in Nazi Germany at the end of the regime, it was not too difficult to draw parallels. Of course, so far as I was concerned in Wisconsin affairs--having taken this definite, positive role--one credits with the liberal community but essentially undying enmity from the old-line conservatives, who by this time were becoming embarrassed by handtooled man McCarthy, but who were stuck with it; people like Walter Koehler, a very decent, honorable gentleman except with questionable political morals mostly, I think, because Joe McCarthy scared the hell out of him. After all, it was Koehler who convinced Mr. Eisenhower that he just had to support Joe when he campaigned in the state. And the other prime mover in Wisconsin, of course, was [Thomas E.] Tom Coleman, the Madison industrialist, again a gentleman in

social terms, who. . . . I'm reasonably sure Mr. Coleman would never entertain Joe McCarthy in his own home but was quite prepared to foist him off on the people of Wisconsin as their elected representative. So that, after all, if one makes a commitment one must be prepared to live with it from then on. But there's no question in my mind but what that '52 campaign separated the sheep from the goats in Wisconsin affairs and all that flows from it.

Well, so we lost the election and then came the eight years of Mr. Eisenhower. And it was during those Eisenhower years that the Wisconsin Democratic party was rebuilt with the major contributions of Jim Doyle, state chairman, [Patrick J.] Pat Lucey, Gaylord Nelson, [William W.] Bill Proxmire, Henry Ruess, and others. As one looks at that period it's really a rather remarkable collection of able people. They represented old-line Democrats, progressive Republicans turned Democrat.

MOSS: When does, let's see, [James] Jim Loeb get into this?

RUNGE: Loeb?

MOSS: Yeah.

RUNGE: In Wisconsin?

MOSS: Right. He came in with the Kennedy people, I think.

RUNGE: But not from Wisconsin.

MOSS: Oh, okay.

RUNGE: Not from Wisconsin.

MOSS: He came in from without. Okay. All right.

RUNGE: Yeah. And of course Nelson was governor, you know, before the Kennedy election--let's see--and Bill Proxmire was in the Senate, having taken [Alexander] Wiley's place, having beaten Wiley. You had [Robert W.] Kastenmeier from this district in the Congress. My wife and I were some of the original people to help Bob get launched and started in Madison. [Clement J.] Zablocki was in the House; he had been in the House. We'd broken through up in the western side of the state with a Norwegian--his name slips my mind--Lester Johnson, who was elected to the Congress from the old ninth congressional district. So that the party not alone was showing substantial strength but in fact had the governorship and one of the positions in the Senate.

Now, my own years, those years in the university, other than doing the obvious things that faculty members do, I had a particular interest in national security affairs, and ran a modest program--based in the law school but related with history and political science particularly--of attempting

to do some serious work in national security affairs.

MOSS: Where did this interest originate? How does that come in?

RUNGE: Well, I suppose in two ways. In some respects, this interest in military and national security affairs is inconsistent, if you please, with my social, political heritage that I think always gave my father some pause. Well, when I came back from the war, I decided that if my commission were to be reasonably active that I wanted to exercise it. And as I suppose, another mark of my parochialism, I had great respect for the history and record of the Wisconsin National Guard, which is a truly distinguished one. After all, it was the Wisconsin regiments that made up the bulk of the Iron Brigade of the Civil War, probably the single most distinguished unit of the Army of the Potomac. And the Wisconsin National Guard carries the traditions of the Iron Brigade. In World War I the Thirty-second Division was formed. I give some of this background because it has a bearing on the Kennedy years. The Thirty-second Division was Wisconsin and Michigan and one of the distinguished divisions of the AEF [American Expeditionary Forces] in 1917 and '18. And then in the twenties and thirties, it continued as the Wisconsin-Michigan unit and went out very early in World War II and served with great distinction in the Southwest Pacific as a part of [General Douglas] MacArthur's command--more days in combat than any other unit in the United States Army.

Well, obviously I had not served in it during the war, but when I came back in '46 I decided that I wanted to be associated with it. So I served through the fifties as a general staff officer, as a logistics officer of the Thirty-second Division which post-World War II was Wisconsin only. We had the full division in the state. Then, after a period of serving as a logistics officer, as lieutenant colonel, I was promoted to the grade of colonel and given command of what we then called division trains--now called the support command of the division--which is one of the five major commands then included in the service and logistical elements. So I had a continuing military activity. And this time period--all of this sounds, I'm afraid, awfully old hat--we had great pride in this unit. It had a great tradition. Part of the tradition in Wisconsin was that it was not a partisan operation; it was not a plaything of the party in power. As a active Democrat, I never experienced--aside from a few personal brushes--anything but wholehearted reception in the officer corps of the division.

The last years that I was in the division, it was commanded by Fritz Bridster from Milwaukee, who was a West Pointer, resigned businessman, National Guardsman, an eminently able, sophisticated gentleman who made this activity a consuming--more than a hobby--kind of a second career. So that we thought that we had, in '59 and '60,

probably, and I think it was acknowledged to be, the best National Guard infantry division in the country. This took a great deal of time and effort for all of us. And it related, then, to my academic interest in national security affairs. I became convinced, from military participation and political activity, that with the role the United States had assumed post-war, the level of expenditure, the level of national commitment to security matters simply could not be ignored or treated only in historical terms in the academic world. Now, mind you, we took our cue, really, from Harvard. The distinguished professor of law at Harvard--the property authority and the brigadier general in the Air Force Reserve-- [W.] Barton Leach had launched, in somewhat more elegant terms, this national security study venture at Harvard, related to law school, [Lucins N.L. Hauer Center for Public Administration] Littauer school, et cetera, and we sort of took our cue from that. And of course, [Henry A.] Kissinger was part of that stable, and Leach was close to [Stuart] Symington, and so on and so forth. We ran some sort of cross-listed social studies based seminars. We supported a certain number of fellowships, did a certain amount of research et cetera, in the general area of national security policy and administration. So that I sort of rounded out my direct military participation by a fair amount of attention to the policy and administrative issues involved in the military establishment. I think that gives a fair sense of why I was concerned broadly about national security affairs, but with perhaps more emphasis on the administrative aspects which interest me--the institutional aspects of the services and the department and the organization of the department, as distinguished from grander strategic design, which I did not attempt to really delve into.

MOSS: Right. Did you play any direct role in the development, say of the National Security Act amendments, the [Henry M.] Jackson subcommittee studies, this kind of thing?

RUNGE: No, I did not have a direct role. It was one of informed observer of this level of activity. But during the late fifties, by virtue of being involved in this venture and bringing guests to the university--people like Leach and [Paul H.] Nitze, senior military officers, senior political figures--I was sort of a fringe member of the group which was active during the period of the second Eisenhower administration that was critical of the Eisenhower-[John Foster]Dulles massive retaliation concept. And I had concluded that as a policy, as a kind of unilateral single national policy, that this was extremely risky, that we seemed to have the ability, and that, as we remember from that period, we had the national capability of engaging in thermonuclear warfare but little else. This left, really, no options other than, if push came to shove, either to go in nuclear terms, or do nothing.

MOSS: Yes. And, of course, this is the thing that [Maxwell D.] Max Taylor was sounding . . .

RUNGE: That's right.

MOSS: . . . this uncertain trumpet thing.

RUNGE: Taylor, [Matthew B.] Ridgway, [James M.] Gavin. Gavin was kind of the intellectual darling of the military establishment at that time. And all of this, of course, carried over, as we know, to the shift in policy during the Kennedy years.

MOSS: How much of this was beginning to happen anyway in the latter part of the Eisenhower administration, with Gates beginning to move in these directions? How much do you think was really being done?

RUNGE: Well, I think my impression is that conceptually the changes were being felt. I think that little had been done in the way of force levels and in the way of equipment. When the Kennedy administration came in, recollection is the army was at a very low ebb in manpower combat formations, levels of equipment. They had struggled for years to get a big enough buy in the major equipment area to have in fact and to have in reserve, adequate conventional levels. But most of that money during the Eisenhower years went into missileery which was, of course, related policywise to the nuclear capability.

MOSS: Okay. That's getting a little bit ahead of the story. Now, let's talk about 1960--'59 and '60--and what you as a person here in Wisconsin who was politically active saw developing politically in the Democratic party. Where do you fit into that picture?

RUNGE: Well, given the heritage, given the fact that I came out of the Progressive side of the Democratic party, I was rather quick to conclude that so far as the nomination was concerned, having gone through those glorious defeats of Adlai Stevenson--number one, that good as he was, that Mr. Stevenson should not be the nominee, though my friend Jim Doyle attempted to carry that banner. And I must say that by this time I had some gnawing suspicion that I wasn't sure that Mr. Stevenson, perhaps because of what I found most attractive in him--essentially a sensitive, compassionate man--that he had the steel that the job might require. So when friend Hubert Humphrey came forward, it was quite natural and with great pleasure that I was involved--not actively, but a little money and my own personal position--in support of Hubert. I wasn't at all sure that Hubert could necessarily carry the day, but I'm, I must say, something of a loyalist in these matters. Humphrey had been of great help in the

rebuilding of the party in Wisconsin. The occasion was never too late or too far away or too insignificant but what Hubert was always prepared to help.

MOSS: Yeah. I've heard it said that Wisconsin Democrats regarded him almost as an honorary senator from Wisconsin.

RUNGE: That's true, and particularly in that period when we didn't have one, and we didn't have a governorship. One of my close friends on the law faculty--now at the University of Minnesota--Carl Auerbach, whose name comes up in all these affairs, a tough, German, Jewish, New York liberal, militantly anti-Communist, old CIA, or OSS [Office of Strategic Services] man, actually, with Arthur Goldberg and others, close friends of Humphrey certainly, helped to shape my own views with respect to Hubert as something more than an effective and dramatic senator and helpmate to the party in Wisconsin but as a serious contender.

Well, the primary in Wisconsin, of course, as always, attracted the candidates and attracted great national attention. So the party sort of divided as you might expect it to divide. Nelson, as governor being very quiet maintained, I think, a reasonable effective neutrality. But there wasn't much question in my mind as to where his heart was. Pat Lucey, and for obvious reasons. . . . Pat was a traditional Irish Catholic Democrat who had one of his own, if you please, available, and on top of that, a monstrously attractive man in Jack Kennedy. Pat picked up some support from other quarters here in Madison, Ivan Nestingen, who was mayor, who was one of the early enlistees in the cause. And, of course, we had a most interesting, hard driving primary election in which Jack Kennedy came off with the majority of the delegates, but Humphrey picked up some district delegates. [Interruption]

MOSS: . . . I think, for a moment, the primary election in Wisconsin. There's a good deal of discussion in the record of who was overestimating the probable result. The Kennedys were claiming that they had more districts locked in than they actually got and Humphrey saying, "Well, look, they predicted they would get all these and then they missed a couple of them, so I look pretty good," and all this tied to the decision of both Humphrey and Kennedy to go to West Virginia and try again. What's your recollection of that?

RUNGE: Well, let me see if I can recollect that. I'm inclined to think that the Kennedy forces thought they were going to do better than they did.

MOSS: I think [Lawrence F.] O'Brien is usually tagged with this.

RUNGE: They had things going for them, just in Jack himself. They loaded the state with staff and workers and family, the whole Kennedy operation--well financed; Hubert--I think I'm right--no, he was not president. Lyndon was majority leader. He must have been assistant . . .

MOSS: Minority.

RUNGE: No, he was assistant . . .

MOSS: Majority leader.

RUNGE: . . . majority leader, with more duties in the Senate, not nearly as well financed.

MOSS: Majority whip.

RUNGE: Yes. He was whip in the Senate, And I think that it is probably fair to say that on balance that Kennedy's operation didn't do quite as well as they may have estimated and, in turn, that Humphrey didn't do as well as he had hoped for, but perhaps a little better than a hard-nosed estimate would have indicated, all of which, as you suggest, leads up to West Virginia.

MOSS: There's also a question of whether or not it broke down along religious lines, whether or not the Lutheran vote was the Humphrey vote and the Milwaukee Catholic vote was the Kennedy vote. How did you see this?

RUNGE: I think it's not quite as simple as that. Certainly the Polish Catholic vote in places like South Milwaukee, Portage County which is Stevens Point, and the Irish Catholic vote in the Fox River valley, and the lake shore, and other intervening areas tended to find the Kennedys attractive, simply on the personal side, and understandably. There was a certain concern and reluctance on the part of the traditional Protestant vote to stay away from this. And I think it is a fair thing to say, in historical terms, that old-line Progressivism--the LaFollette Progressive in Wisconsin--was essentially [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant] WASP. It was white because there wasn't anyone else, and it was Anglo-Saxon in the sense that the leadership came from the Scandinavian and German communities. And in turn, this meant that Progressivism was strong in Dane County; it was strong generally on a kind of a crescent swinging from Dane County up the western side of the state and into the north where you did have substantial Scandinavian, or peoples of Scandinavian descent. It was strong in the old German liberal bastions of Manitowoc and Sheboygan and into Milwaukee. And as I've suggested earlier, you have people in the Democratic party that came out of that tradition and not just on religious

grounds--but this was a part of it--but on their traditional political allegiance, would stay with a Humphrey, albeit an Irishman, but nonetheless, who represented farm labor Progressivism. It was indigenous liberalism. So that, religion apart, but almost, or not as a naked issue but as part of the Wisconsin political history.

MOSS: A kind of provincial position. Are there any events of that primary that stand out in your mind as unusual, or any clear vivid recollections of things that--in the way of local color and that kind of thing?

RUNGE: Well, I suppose the thing that always intrigued me and amused me was the way the liberal community, particularly in Madison--the liberal-intellectual community--was panting to be co-opted by the glamor of the Kennedys.

MOSS: In what ways? How did this manifest itself?

RUNGE: Well, it manifested itself by the way political people, or people that are contributors and attenders and local leaders in one form or another, were beguiled and attracted by the Kennedys and the Kennedy family. If Sargent Shriver was sent into town the young matrons as well as their husbands were vying with one another to appear and be seen. I'd say I find this, I always found this amusing on the part of people who pride themselves on their objectivity. All it really suggests, I think, is that regardless of pretense, intellectual pretense, people, after all, are human. And, as I suggested earlier, this is a monstrously attractive group.

MOSS: On the practical--organizing and getting in touch with people--it's been said that the ward politics of Boston was really not good prepping ground for running an election in Wisconsin. Was this evident, that they were doing the wrong things at any time--the outsiders coming in?

RUNGE: I think that they may have overdone this a bit. It became somewhat counterproductive, because in a sense, while it may not have been too good here, the kind of old-line Boston approach which is tough as hell and ruthless also tends to pay at least short-term dividends. And they put together a stable of people, some outsiders and some that they'd picked up on the local scene, who were prepared to play a very hard-driving game. And while I think that it may have been, as I suggested, somewhat counterproductive and offensive to some, I don't really think that this hurt them a great deal, this kind of tactic, I suggest, does not, except on a few occasions, really cause any immediate damage. I think this kind of technique has a longer term negative impact.

MOSS: Does anybody stand out in your memory as being particularly effective, other than just sort of the family charisma thing--more on the organizing end of things?

RUNGE: Well, I think Pat's efforts, Pat Lucey's efforts, probably were his knowledge of the state, his knowledge of the party--having been state chairman--and the kind of linkage that he provided between the Kennedy's resources and outside writers and advertising people and all the paraphernalia. He provided the effective link between all of that kind of outside capability that got it, that hooked it together with county structure and a man in the county and met in the wards and precincts. So I think that Lucey must be given great credit for the people that he assembled and the linkage that he provided with the outside Kennedy staff.
[Interruption]

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

MOSS: With the primary mover and your man having lost, where does that leave you?

RUNGE: Well, that, of course, kind of left me up in the air, concluding that. . . . Because by this time--particularly after West Virginia--it seemed to me Kennedy, in all likelihood, was going to go all the way.

MOSS: Did you have any insight into the decision of Humphrey to go into West Virginia?

RUNGE: No. I didn't know. I know not. But I think you probably touched on it earlier when you said that Humphrey came out of Wisconsin not an absolute disgrace, but seemingly with a fighting chance perhaps in a state that was not, in many respects, unlike northern Minnesota--low income, impoverished, mining kind of country where Hubert's style could, under certain circumstances, be expected to be very effective.

MOSS: Okay. So after Kennedy wins in West Virginia, you--what was your position then?

RUNGE: Well, I still hadn't come over. And this is where we get into the Johnson phase of this. Because I, being a kind of party loyalist and appreciating, at least to my own satisfaction, that all Southerners are not bad, I had historical respect for the role of the Southerners in the Democratic party. The fact that in bad years they kept it alive in the Congress for a long time, and that in the Roosevelt years by and large gave substantial support to the New Deal, and to Mr. Truman not as much but to the New Deal, and that people like Lister Hill, for example, John Sparkman,

and at one time the rest of the congressional delegation from Alabama in my judgement was a hell of a lot better than what my own state was saying to the Congress, and a great respect for Mr. [Sam] Rayburn. . . . I consider Rayburn one of the unappreciated contributing heroes of the Democratic party in our time--the role that he played in the Roosevelt period, in his years as Speaker. So that I did not find Lyndon Baines Johnson to be simply an oiled, greased mountebank that he was viewed in the North. Remember that Bill Proxmire, early in his career, had tried to take him on. And, of course, the local liberals hated his guts. But I didn't. I liked him, I respected him, and I thought that Johnson was--and I still think--perhaps the last of the Jacksonians. This was a man of modest means who had fought and clawed his way to the top, but that, in fact, understood the problems not just of the South, but the problems of the small town, the rural area, and perhaps in his own way with a greater feeling for the minorities, minority groups, than some of us in the North, who had all the rhetoric but little of the experience.

So I was--you ask--at that time prepared to hope--because there was precious little you could do about it in Wisconsin--that Lyndon might rally enough support to give Jack Kennedy a fight, and that you might end up, you see, with the kind of ticket that you ended up with four years later, which would be the Johnson-Humphrey relationship, because both Johnson and Humphrey, for better or for worse, are my kind of Democrat. And, of course, comes the convention, and low and behold, it isn't Johnson-Humphrey but it's Jack Kennedy, for whatever reason--and you have, this is, you know, stories have been told over and over again--he did what he had to do, which was to put Lyndon on that ticket in order to win the election. So when this occurred, you see, I remember laughing about this, gossiping a little bit with Pat Lucey that, from my point of view, all had not been lost because there was Lyndon, big as life, on the ticket. There were, you know. . . . And God knows, there weren't many of us in Wisconsin that openly admitted any recognition or appreciation of Lyndon Johnson. I think there were probably two or three of us in the state. Ralph Huitt, on our political science faculty, who was a Texan, was really the only person in Madison with whom I talked about these things. And though he was very quiet about it, as he had to be in his position, I think Paul Ringler, editorial chief of the Milwaukee Journal, was somewhat taken with Lyndon as a serious candidate or for a potential president.

MOSS: Did you have a role in the election proper?

RUNGE: A modest one. In other words, I helped a little bit, nothing very spectacular--giving money and helping arrange things and, you know, meeting speakers when they came into town and the kind of supportive role that one can play in the campaign. But, of course, Johnson had the southern operation to run and in Wisconsin it

was Kennedy and the Kennedy organization, and Pat on the local scene, that was running the show.

MOSS: Okay. Well, what were the circumstances, then, that led to your nomination as assistant secretary [of Defense] with Manpower?

RUNGE: Well, number one, in just raw political terms, I was interested in seeing if a position might be available. I didn't really aspire to the position I got. I thought that I might--because I knew the army the best--end up in some spot in the army secretariat. I think Elvis Stahr was the first senior official appointed by the Kennedy administration. Of course, I talked to Pat about all of this, and because of Wisconsin's part in the victory, Pat stood very high indeed with the president himself and the whole operation--[Kenneth P.] O'Donnell and O'Brien and the political operators in the mix. So, in part, it was Lucey's sponsorship; that was number one. So then I knew some of the other people; I knew Nitze slightly. And, of course, I knew that I also would have not just Lucey's sponsorship but Nelson's approval. And I think I'm right about this, that Nitze called me one day--and this was just after the inauguration; this was not preinauguration, but just after the inauguration--to ask if I could come down and talk to people, and that there were, you know, there was a possibility of something being available. And I did, but not on the army side but on OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] side, and [Robert S.] McNamara and [Roswell L.] Gilpatric--I think at that juncture.

Well, it's my understanding--I never really pursued this --that somewhere in the process of the campaign, that the president had made a tentative agreement, or indicated that he would entertain or be willing to appoint someone that organized labor would put forward for that particular Manpower position. I think the man they had in mind, if I can remember his name . . .

MOSS: [Joseph] Joe Kennan.

RUNGE: . . . Kennan. Right. You're absolutely right. Kennan, who really, in all that I know, is one of the statesmen in the labor movement and had served after the war in the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] program in Europe was a man of parts, an idealist, able man, and, as I say, a labor statesman. Well, McNamara It's my understanding, conditions of the president were that he would not accept people in effect put upon by any previous political understanding or on the motion of the White House staff, if you please. And he found a man from organized labor objectionable. This caused some embarrassment all around. And I think kind of fortuitously, I kind of turned up. So that, if you please, my own appreciation of this--and I didn't

quite know it all at the time, but I found out rather soon--that perhaps I was the lesser of objectionable or questionable people that might be put in this role.

MOSS: Or at least a ready alternative that could be flung into the breach.

RUNGE: That's right. So, you see, I went into this with only modest political status, because it was perfectly obvious that while I had been loyal and helpful, I was hardly part of what we used to call--"For Roosevelt before Chicago," or . . .

MOSS: You were not Kennedy before Wisconsin. This is . . .

RUNGE: No. No, I was not.

MOSS: Yeah. What sort of things did Gilpatric and McNamara talk to you about when you met them, and how did they impress you on that first meeting?

RUNGE: Well, I'm not sure that I can recollect at this stage what we talked about. It was rather superficial. Gilpatric was much the warmer of the two; after all, this is an urbane, sophisticated New York lawyer with an earlier history himself in the secretariat in the Air Force, close to [Thomas K.] Finletter, [Stuart] Symington--that kind of Air Force set of intellectuals. It's that McNamara a cold, most efficient, businesslike sort of guy who I think in retrospect--perhaps as you suggested--thought that this was at least an acceptable alternative. And I don't think we spent a great deal of time at it. I think probably the part of the alternative aspect was that coming from Wisconsin--given the university's role and reputation--the fact that at least in some quarters, my record was pretty good as a liberal, given the McCarthy period and the fact that [Andrew] Andy Innof, who was [George] Meany's chief lobbyist, was an acquaintance--the old socialist, Danish-Progressive out in Milwaukee--probably took the edge off Meany's pique. So I suggest that that's probably about all there is to it.

MOSS: When and how did you get definite word that this was . . .

RUNGE: Oh, well, this didn't take very long. I think I was out there two days, and I guess I waited around a day or so. And as I recall--I was staying with a friend--Gilpatric called me and said this was acceptable and cleared, and we'll be about it.

MOSS: And as I understand it was announced on--what--the twenty-fifth, I think, of January--shortly after?

RUNGE: About then, yeah.

MOSS: Okay. What sort of reservations and expectations did you have about this job, and what sort of things did you discover from McNamara and Gilpatric that they expected of you in it?

RUNGE: Well, I think, you know, the expectations were general, that one might make a contribution in realigning that department, and to provide the country with a broader set of options for military commitments as needed. This goes back to my concern about the massive retaliation policy which has marked the Eisenhower period. I rather welcomed the particular assignment because I was naive enough to believe--having served and having participated in reserve activities, National Guard activities--that I had a sense of shall we say the sociology of the military establishment that would stand me in good stead in terms of relating the civilian secretariat to the uniformed military. And because I did not fancy myself a strategist, I was, you know, reasonably comfortable with the area of responsibility. I think my reservations from the beginning were that this was kind of a high-powered operation with essentially kind of a corporate rather than a political orientation--not the administration, but the secretariat. McNamara was the Harvard Business School trained modern breed of corporate executive and Ross Gilpatric was very much the corporate counsel. Gilpatric had some experience--well substantial experience, I think, of a year or two--in the secretariat and was more active in political affairs in New York, certainly, than McNamara. But in retrospect, I'd put it this way, that I've had the experience of serving in big business without suffering the indignity.

MOSS: Was this apparent to you at the beginning, or was this something that you discovered over time?

RUNGE: No, this was an apprehension that I had from the beginning.

MOSS: Yeah. And what sort of things was McNamara doing to take over the department as you observed it?

RUNGE: Well, you see, he'd been there a month or so by then, and was rather, well, as you know, his style of operation was moving quickly to capture control, if you please, of the department. But he was determined not to be the patsy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but rather that they would be responsive to him, and had launched a whole series of special studies and inquiries into the operation, some of which were launched, some of which were to get underway. And with Nitze playing--given his assignment--the linkage role with State and looking, essentially, at strategic policy, [Thomas D.] Tom Morris trying to get a fix on the

material side of things, and [Cyrus R.] Cy Vance, who was and continues to be much admired, as far as I'm concerned, and a friend emerging even then, I would say, from the very beginning as a very influential and extremely competent counsel, and who was given. . . . Well, McNamara did listen to Vance, as much as he listened to anyone. And Cy, after all, had strengths of his own. After all, he had been a Johnson man too. But he brought more to it than that; one, his own abilities, but I think I'm right--I think Cy is, isn't he a grandson or grand-nephew or something of John W. Davis?

MOSS: I don't know. I don't know.

RUNGE: He's from West Virginia. And after all, Davis was one of the county's great lawyers and New York associations and so on. So if there was anything that marked this early period, it was the fact that McNamara set about, with great vigor, to in fact exercise his authority to the utmost, vis à vis service secretaries and vis à vis the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MOSS: Yes, his famous ninety-six questions thing that came around: How did you personally react to that? What was. . . . How, did this affect you?

RUNGE: Well, you see, each subset, you know, in the secretariat had certain of these questions and resulting substudies that we were supposed to cope with. Now, let me add kind of a footnote. I said that one of the reasons I found this particular subsecretariat interesting grew out of my own relations with the military. It also happens to be the area which, then and now, is kind of a last vestige of substantial control that the military services have. After all, a secretary of the service doesn't conduct operations. I mean, they play a training and supportive role, but people still are commissioned: United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. In questions of personnel policy, questions of manpower requirements and the training and education and the health, all those things that run to the people is, in many respects, the area in which they die the hardest on any change and are most fundamentally concerned. So that this happens to be, in broad terms, the area in which the services are the most concerned, vis à vis directions that come from the secretary of Defense, which makes it a hot seat. And, as I learned, because it was a hot seat from the secretariat's point of view--and for a secretary who was attempting to impose his will on the services--one in which having had long and close ties with the uniformed military probably does not stand one in good stead. I mentioned key people, and obviously [Charles J.] Charlie Hitch. Because Hitch was a quantitative economist, and was a key man to McNamara in terms of getting control because the comptroller, had expanded, was the instrument by which this control was imposed, not just through budget, but through analysis. And,

of course, [Alain] Enthoven was on the scene then as Hitch's key man. And a measure of where McNamara was turning was the way supergrade positions were allocated.

MOSS: Such as?

RUNGE: You mean by name?

MOSS: No, not necessarily by name, but quantitatively by area and that kind of thing.

RUNGE: Oh, this is what I'm getting at. You see, as we carved out and were allowed GS-16s, 17s and 18s, these were for the most part put into the comptroller's office, into Nitze's office, and the bulk of the--I've forgotten what you'd call them; they're the science, technical categories in the . . .

MOSS: Harold Brown's area.

RUNGE: . . . senior civil service--went into Defense Research and Engineering. So that McNamara was using the comptroller in an increasingly important role to get internal management controls and, over in ISA [International Security Affairs] in Nitze's operation, to strengthen his position vis a vis the Joint Chiefs on strategic plans and policies. And whether, in this early stage, this was appreciated or not, I don't know, but probably so--to strengthen the role of the department and McNamara as secretary vis à vis the State Department. In other words, I think, given McNamara the man, that he didn't put much stock in the historical fact that the secretary of state, in terms of protocol, outranks the secretary of war.

MOSS: What sort of. . . . You mentioned the Hitch operation as an instrumentality of institutional control.

RUNGE: Yeah.

MOSS: Were there personal things. For instance, I understand that McNamara had fairly regular breakfast meetings with his assistant secretaries. When did this begin? Do you recall the use to which he put these?

RUNGE: Well, either breakfast meetings or kind of early morning sessions. But I think it was pretty clear that he had his key men, and then people who were there but not on the inner circle. I was never in the inner circle.

MOSS: Who were the inner circle, outside of Hitch and Enthoven and Nitze?

- RUNGE: Well, Vance--I really think that was the inner circle.
- MOSS: In what ways did you see times at which the inner circle was obviously clued in beforehand, or how did you make this distinction?
- RUNGE: Well, I think that you can sort of sense that by the frequency with which these people appear in the front office, and who was given key assignments and who, in fact, had carried any weight in council.
- MOSS: All right. Given the critical nature of your function, what did this situation do to you in trying to get things done in your area? Were you ever shut up, in other words?
- RUNGE: Well, yes, at times. I'll try to be responsive to that. To the extent that McNamara used a quantitative and statistical methodology, my office In retrospect, this was an obvious kind of error on my part. If I had been perceptive enough, I would at least have tried or made a greater effort to develop some internal quantitative capability. I had a few people that were reasonably good in analysis and handling of numbers and so on, but they made a pretty bad show of it compared to the kind of people that Hitch either had--drawing out of the old budget function--or brought in, with Enthoven. What happened is that on matters of troop levels, let's say, that the comptroller's office and McNamara made an effort, and perhaps after I left succeeded in taking the whole question of Manpower requirements, which is a staff responsibility, out of that office and put it in the comptroller's office, but he would have. He was later on the Board of Economic Advisors. What's his name, the economist--[Merton J.] Peck, from Yale--exceedingly bright, able fellow--was down there working for Enthoven, reviewing and analyzing, let's say, troop levels, force levels in Europe, and where these cuts could come or might come, and how we went through drill after drill in terms of kind of rotation exercises, some of which Peck and the comptroller's people would push to the ultimate, to me, to the point in which the whole thing became operationally unwise. In my judgment, and maybe I was trying to play a military role, I would find myself siding--simply because that's the way I saw the issue--with, let's say, the Air Force staff or the Army staff vis a vis the people in the comptroller's office.
- MOSS: Okay. What do you think are the implications of each of the positions, one a managerial, supposedly rational, the other one, an advisorial kind of thing, traditional kind of approach?

RUNGE: Well, I think that the managerial, analytical approach and the methods employed are powerful tools and that they should be employed. My concern was that there are certain elements that you find difficult to quantify which they would tend to ignore and . . .

MOSS: This is something I want to pin down, because you get Enthoven and others answering the same, "No, we really didn't ignore these things. We knew they were there. We left certain things to judgement. We quantified what we could quantify; we did not quantify the things that shouldn't be." What specifically is it? Can we bore in on it?

RUNGE: Well, we'll try, though this is hard. This is hard, because I'm sure that Enthoven and his stable have an honest position on this. My own reaction was that if they took them into consideration, their weightings would tend to be inadequate, or they were represented in such a way and kind of tuned to the chief manager in such a way that though it was ostensibly an alternative, that it was conveyed in such a manner that it became the minimus in the process. This is very difficult to get at. But, in other words, I guess my impression is that if you had had a secretary, or if you have a secretary who is not necessarily intellectually precommitted, that you may get a better result than having a secretary who is desirous and is intellectually wedded to the method. And this maybe is a place to give my concern, not quantitatively oriented . . .

[Interruption]

MOSS: Okay. You were saying that if you did not, if you had a You were trying to bring the political and policy input to balance, to counteract the managerial approach . . .

RUNGE: Yes. Because I'm saying, you see, or I said that if the secretary were a broader man and not, by his own experience and conviction, committed to the quantitative, managerial method, that then, you see, you tend to achieve a balance. My concern about McNamara, and I had and have great respect for this man's capacity--just raw ability--I thought that his efficiency, and this is where my bias shows, given the record, the full record, that he was devoid of political sensitivity, an appreciation of the political process and an appreciation of the role of the military in American institutions, that in being essentially almost blind to these areas, he viewed the Congress as an adversary, and this is always true; the executive branch in our system is in this position vis à vis the Congress--but along with that, really with disdain. And this does not happen to be my philosophy. I recognize the adversary role. But I must say that in terms of exercising statesmanlike

judgement, I was not prepared, nor am I now, to write off the kind of wisdom of experience that a Carl Vinson brings to National Security Affairs. My God, this man had gone through this drill since 1912!

MOSS: All right. Now, in what ways was McNamara writing this kind of thing off, and particularly where it affected your office. Could you throw in some examples?

RUNGE: Yes, I think I can. My reaction was that the gambit with Congress was to . . . I don't want to be too critical of this because obviously a person appearing as the secretary of defense must, on this whole series of issues, one doesn't go down there, of course, in kind of a fumbling old-shoe sort of way. You want to make an impressive, persuasive, documented appearance, and certainly he did this--tremendously impressive, this raw ability to marshall and array facts, argument and analysis. But I think that in the man was essentially contempt, both for the ability and the judgment and perhaps the intellectual honesty of the people in the Congress. It really resulted in kind of disdain, that these people had to be coped with, but that in terms of the Congress being in any way a partner in the effort was foreign to his concept of the office.

MOSS: Okay. I understand this as your impression of it. Can I pin you a little harder, and ask you to come up with the instance that illustrates this kind of thing?

RUNGE: Well yes, I suppose the area in which we not alone had organizational problems, but we had operational problems, is a part of the Berlin rioting reaction.

MOSS: Reserve, National Guard called in.

RUNGE: Reserve and National Guard area. Now, without any question, this is an area in which I have a very real bias. But I found in McNamara and, in fact, in the Kennedy administration essentially the historians, or what I would call the sum of the military historians and general American historians kind of write-off, you see, of the whole militia tradition. Well, I happen to think they're wrong. And these forces, in my mind, can be reasonably effective in terms of proper allowance for training and time to respond and so on, to make a material contribution. And over and above that, I think that this whole side, you see, is a part and parcel of the American military institutional history, which has some very real pluses in it for the country., And McNamara's notion that somehow, by God, we were either gonna get a dollar's worth for every dollar spent out of this establishment, enough of this nonsense in terms of babying this crowd of malcontents who had nothing but demands and

claims on the one hand and very little to offer and their lobbying role with the Congress--really kind of fundamental disagreement.

I had thought, you see, that we could improve the dollar for the dollar spent capability of this establishment, really based on my own working experience; what I submitted was one of the better units of its kind. In other words, God knows I had no objection to it, in terms of high standards of qualification of the officer corps and all the rest of it. On the other hand, you can't achieve these things without providing them with adequate equipment and a proper troop base. And I was troubled about this sort of harassment of this establishment this continuing and constant reorganization, reformation of units, inadequacy of equipment, inadequacy of training support. So that McNamara viewed this whole reserve question as kind of part and parcel with his estimate of the worst of the Congress, you see, that they were just prepared to maintain a kind of their army, if you please--or service--and in a what he would deem to be essentially pork barrel kind of activity. You build armories, you pour a lot of equipment out there to sit around and go idle, supplementary pay for people that don't deserve it. I found that the whole reserve establishment was almost beneath their contempt. This came not just from McNamara but from people like [Adam] Yarmolinsky, who had had None of these people had had any experience, but this was in their minds all to their credit. Anyone who had was prima facie suspect of simply representing, you see, the worst in all of this.

Well, I suggested to McNamara at one time that--and I think this is an area worth focusing on--as the Defense Department and the army took over responsibility for the civil defense mission, that it didn't make any sense on the one hand to be trying to encourage and generate activity and citizen participation and all of that side of the issue at the same time as you were cutting down your troop strength and taking units out of, and eliminating units in county seat communities in one place or another around the country. Now, I have another thesis on this and it has some bearing today and, I suspect, in the future. I thought that the reserve establishment provided an intermediate link between the citizenry and any administration in the Department of Defense that was a substantial ally in political terms--not partisan political terms but in the best sense of the term--to have a built-in support on a county-by-county basis for military commitments and military ventures that any administration might have to take, and that it And first, one can immediately find the negative aspects of this, but it was in the country's interest and any president's interest to have lawyers, doctors, bankers, newspaper people and a few university professors, people in responsible civic roles who had an understanding and a personal commitment to the nation's defense, that this happened to be a part of the American tradition. It served us well in the past and might damn well serve us in the future. And to the extent that these people

were harrassed, joustled, eliminated, reorganized and generally disgruntled, this was taking a substantial political risk, given, when compared to the kind of positive support that these people can give a president when in fact he's exercising his role as commander in chief.

MOSS: Okay. Did you put this to McNamara in these terms?

RUNGE: Yes.

MOSS: Okay. And what was his reaction?

RUNGE: Well, this is difficult because I'm not sure I can recollect with any precision. But as best I can, I think his reaction would be: one, that that really wasn't his concern; that this was a political concern which was not necessarily his responsibility; that it was assuming, if it was true--and he wasn't so sure that it had any merit to it at all--that this kind of built-in relationship wasn't too important; that the job would be done primarily with regulars anyway--I mean with the regular establishment--and that this kind of second-level of support was questionable, if one wanted to put it in political terms, and that it was inefficient. His job was, as the president had told him, to get every dollar's worth out of those appropriations that you can in measurable, discernible military capability.

MOSS: You mentioned civil defense a moment ago. What was your reaction to: one, civil defense coming over to the Pentagon from OEP [Office of Emergency Planning] and; secondly, Yarmolinsky getting the ball first of all.

RUNGE: Well, in general terms I thought it most appropriate. I couldn't see, really, how you could divide and somehow run on the civil side a reaction to thermonuclear holocaust. And I saw it as an opportunity to consolidate in the local communities. If you put it in the Department of Defense, the whole reserve establishment with these forces and being with some discipline, with some equipment, and tie it to their local authorities, in the event of emergency, the secretary of defense would in fact become responsible for the internal defense and rehabilitation of the continental U.S.

MOSS: More like the British home guard role?

RUNGE: That's right. As well as the world-wide commitments. So I've always supported that concept. I think it was right. Now, the civil defense has become increasingly distasteful over the years. I guess I understand why. I just hope to God that the gut reaction to the program, both within the government and on the part of the people, is a valid one: namely that we have achieved a degree of nuclear parity, and it just isn't going to happen. And,

you know, let us hope. On the other hand, if it ever occurs, that program, despite the fact that it's in the department, is a puny and a weak breed. My own notion, and I had some part in this with the people from the White House--one of the president's military aides was [Tazewell T.] Shepard. Wasn't his name Shepard?

MOSS: Yeah. Tazewell Shepard.

RUNGE: Tazewell Shepard, naval officer, very able guy and was kind of concerned about these affairs. So I had some modest collateral input into that. We had had an office in my side of the department that had had a relationship, you see, to the operation when it was over wholly under the . . .

MOSS: In OEP.

RUNGE: . . . emergency preparedness office. I had some ideas, and Vance and I pursued some of this. This really came into the area of internal domestic political organization. I didn't think it made any sense--and I think they still do it this way and I don't think it makes any sense now--that if you have someone in a kind of a civil defense structure that is supposed to exercise [interruption] authority, well, no one knows who these people are. And their role vis a vis the continental army commanders has never been clarified to my knowledge. And all of this concerned me because I thought we had never really faced up to the role, not to the role of the president but to the role of the department--civil-military--in the field, in the event of an emergency. And I don't think we. . . . To my knowledge, it has never really been faced. And I suspect that if, God forbid, this ever befell us, that the role of the president with respect to the governors, the governors with respect to the president's deputy if there is one, is ill-defined and that it's going to be a shambles. It's not wholly appropriate, but the fact that these damn telephones that supposedly link in the governor's office to that office at Colorado Springs apparently turned out to be listening devices. I cite this as an example of the confusion and the inadequacy of our internal emergency planning.

MOSS: All right. Why, then, with all this emphasis on systems analysis and so on, was this not conceived of as a system? You had many changes in the Kennedy administration, the development of the unified commands, for instance, as a more integral kind of thing. Why was this not also looked at in a systematic way?

RUNGE: I don't really know, except that I suspect that this may have gone above McNamara. I'm not sure that the administration was prepared to treat it as a system and to follow on, you see . . .

MOSS: Logical consequences?

RUNGE: Logical consequences. Because if you do this, it then can appear--more than seem to appear--it would be a recognition that in the event of emergency that, in fact, it was turned into a very tight authoritarian operation, and that they were not quite prepared to buy that. Though I must say that after the Cuban affair I would have thought that this should have been faced. But I suspect that they didn't want to face the logical consequences of that kind of analysis. So, really, what we did, you know, after we took the thing over was we went into the shelter program . . .

MOSS: Yes, I was going to say.

RUNGE: . . . and turned the [Army] Corps of Engineers and yards and docks to the task of measuring out basements and concluding, you see--and maybe rightly so, but I always took a somewhat cynical view of this--that if you measured enough and so on that you could find just one hell of a lot of adequate shelter space that, in fact, existed. This meant you didn't have to build it, and that by putting canned water in those spaces that you could really provide this measure of security on the cheap. I mean that's what it came down to.

BEGIN TAPE II SIDE I

MOSS: All right. Did you see any substantial change in this when Steuart Pittman came over, took over from Yarmolinsky on it?

RUNGE: Well, I felt that Pittman brought some realism to the thing. It became more tidy, among other things, and organized. And he brought some, I think, fairly able kind of senior people into that office. This becomes a little hazy now. My impression was that Pittman was prepared, if you please, to take in due course, you see, a kind of a systems approach in which implications would in fact be examined and logical consequences pursued. Now, I suppose another factor on the civil defense issue, and this could suggest that it may come back to us, you know--may, probably not, but might. As our nuclear superiority was, or became manifest, both in terms of a reanalysis of the relationship and the activities pursued to ensure it, then logically, the necessity for the program was less apparent.

MOSS: Let me turn to another general area and ask you about two things: one is the writing out of the executive order on employee-management relations in the federal government, and the equal employment opportunity as it was beginning to develop, particularly, say, Esther Peterson and her Women's Commission, the question of getting

women into flag rank in the services, and this kind of thing. What are your recollections of that? Where was the impetus coming? Who was pushing for it, and so on?

RUNGE: Well, first of all, on the role of the federal employee: This to me was one of the more satisfying experiences that I had because Arthur Goldberg ran it. Now, in my judgement Goldberg was the single best Cabinet officer that the president had. He brought great competence. He was a most effective operator. And I really related with Goldberg on this particular issue, and the other was the missile site labor crisis, Goldberg brought that into hand quickly. He was in a position. He knew these characters. And he wouldn't allow the president of the national union to tell him that this was somehow the shop steward out there in South Dakota, and that he, Mr. Big, really wasn't responsible. Well, Goldberg was tougher than hell with the union people. And as soon as the union people, or the contractors realized the role that Goldberg was playing they became most cooperative. So that this thing was tidied up in short order. And it was Goldberg, the experienced man, most effective with people, in those days. . . . I haven't seen Arthur in a couple of years, and from what I read about his campaign in New York, having been a justice or a secretary or in the U.N. [United Nations] and so on, I think the thing is he may have lost some of his homely, earthy abilities.

MOSS: It certainly is hard to think of him as earthy and homely, after . . .

RUNGE: But he was that, you see?

MOSS: Yeah.

RUNGE: And most effective and most effective representing the president, representing the administration and his sector. I think brought balance and good sense into--as best I could see--into the highest councils.

Well, on the employment side, after all, we had most of the employees; post office had a hell of a lot of people that historically had had unions, and the rest of the people were sort of along for the ride. I had, in this area, one of the better people in my office, a man named Leon Wheelless--old Mississippian, one of these savvy sophisticated southerners who had been, I think, for many years in charge of employment matters at the state level but with those ties to the Department of Labor. Wheelless was excellent, and of course, knew the Civil Service Commission people, and also in this area [John W., Jr.] Macy--John Macy, first rate. Macy and Goldberg, and the postmaster general was then [J. Edward] Ed Day, and I was there from Defense with Wheelless. My opinion is that we did one hell of a good job. You know, it was my kind of ballgame because it was policy-oriented; it was kind of accomodations and negotiation and adjustments.

MOSS: Of course, it's come along a good way since then.

RUNGE: Oh, yes, it has.

MOSS: If you had envisioned that it would come along as rapidly as it has when you were beginning in this were there any reservations about what this might be leading to? What did you expect to do and how did you expect it to develop?

RUNGE: Well, I guess I saw it at least not as the end but really as the beginning, that this whole area of public employment had been kept under wraps for a long time but that this was the breakthrough and really the beginning. And I think Goldberg saw it the same way but because of the kind of old hand that he was he also appreciated that this had to be incremental.

MOSS: You think this was quite deliberate. Is this an impression or is it something that you and he talked about or . . .

RUNGE: It's hard to recollect that now. But I think I am reasonably accurate in saying that this was recognized; this was recognized. So that, and he was the Cabinet officer--other than our own department--that I was closest to and so one tends to be biased by virtue of this. But nonetheless, I think from looking at the larger picture, I concluded that this was the best Cabinet officer that he had because he had expertise and he understood the political system. For example, I think I'm right in saying that in '60, when the president picked Lyndon as a runningmate, and Arthur then ended up being general counsel, you know, of the labor movement, he was appalled and troubled. I think that Arthur and Lyndon during the early Kennedy years became very close, because . . .

MOSS: Of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

RUNGE: Yes, and because these were people, you see, with kind of a common background, albeit arrived at rather differently. Because they were people who understood process and were interested in using it and working with it as opposed to fighting it, in counterdistinction to the point I made earlier about McNamara

MOSS: Yeah, yeah.

RUNGE: Now you asked me about the . . .

MOSS: Equal employment.

RUNGE: . . . women and employment, I

MOSS: Yeah. There are two aspects of that, I guess. You've got the women in the services and in federal government. You've got the question of government contracts with employers that discriminate. Did you get into that end of it at all?

RUNGE: Yes, somewhat. I think that these, you know, these social questions were being pushed--White House staff--and Adam, of course, was their agent in the Defense Department. Now, I think Yarmolinsky was always suspicious of me, that I didn't really somehow believe in equal opportunity for blacks or minority groups or women or anyone else. And I don't know that I ever really satisfied him. But I had no essential differences on the issue, except on implementation from time to time. Now, the question of women in the service really wasn't too significant. We kind of increased their status and had proposals with respect to their role. And I remember [William R., III] Smedberg, I think, who was chief of the naval personnel, saying in high dudgeon one day that, "My God, they'll want an admiral next or something." Well, you see, they have now. And so that evolved in due course.

MOSS: You don't happen to recall a meeting at Hyde Park with Esther Peterson's commission on the . . .

RUNGE: Oh, I do, I do.

MOSS: As I understand it there's no record of that meeting. Do you recall any of the things that happened there?

RUNGE: Well, I remember the trip because [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan and I went up--I've forgotten--Nick, Nicholas Katzenbach was there representing justice, and I think Macy was there, I don't think Goldberg was. [W. Willard] Wirtz may have been there. But it interests me that there was no record. It was really Mrs. [Eleanor R.] Roosevelt's party. And gracious lady that she was, you know, saw to it that everyone was comfortable and happy and duly appreciative of being at the shrine and all of that. And my recollection was that there were some issues . . . And, you know, that commission that they had put together was the greatest collection of second-generation suffragettes that one can imagine. Some of these embattled old biddies, you know, that you'd expect to bring her ax out and start smashing the bottles at the drop of a hat. But Mrs. Roosevelt was extremely able in handling these people, see. They really wouldn't cross her. And I think she kind of liked all these nice young men. And I suppose as a group we were reasonably presentable, you know, and with a certain amount of charm--you know, Moynihan and Katzenbach and Macy and the rest of us. So that, and she kind of in a Goldbergian way, you see, was

prepared to tell the old girls that it wasn't all going to come at one fell swoop and defined the necessary accommodation. I can't really recollect what the issues were, but I do recollect Mrs. Roosevelt's charming and effective manner of finding acceptable positions as between the executive departments represented and the lady liberationists of the day.

MOSS: Yeah. We can come back to the question of integration and so on. There was a question of integrating National Guard units which it seems was very sticky in some places. What do you recall of this?

RUNGE: Well, I recall personally, and as far as my office was concerned, that we all recognized the constitutional problem. We recognized the necessity that this be effected. I recall that this came to some kind of critical point, and I think this was started as Berlin was warming up. I took the position then that this could not be pushed to the ultimate. My concern was that we had some of these particular units in the South, a unit like the Thirtieth Division, which was one of the priority National Guard divisions; that this could not be brought to a showdown; that we were dealing with something, with a facet rather different than elementary school education; that we could not force the issue to the point of disrupting and possibly in the process destroying the military effectiveness of some of these units which were critical indeed in terms of supporting the active establishment. And that position really prevailed, and on the other hand, recognizing that this, again, had to be a longer-term problem.

There's a facet of that, and it isn't just the black officer. It's the question of the officer corps of the National Guard. If anything, we've gone downhill in this respect over the years. And it's the one area of defense affairs that I continue to keep an interest in because I think that the heart of the whole operation is the officer corps. We pay great attention--or at least we profess to--to the quality of the officer corps in the regular establishment, but we allow the states to continue to commission their own people, not just the official commission but the training of them. At the moment I am chairman of a group within the academic community nationally that's staking out a position of modest reform for the ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] program, because I think those programs are essential in terms of the active establishment and equally essential in terms of the reserve establishment. And one of my concerns has been that ROTC graduates have not, in fact, gotten back into National Guard units, which is most unfortunate. Well, that's kind of a diversion, but that's really what I recollect of that issue, that we were prepared to pressure and induce but that we were not prepared in the department--and this was sustained in the administration of taking the activists' civil rights position which was urged upon us--to crack down on the

southern National Guard units. We were not prepared to carry it to the ultimate because we were concerned about pulling apart these forces that we thought were critical.

MOSS: Did you get involved at all in the mobilization of National Guard units for Birmingham and Oxford?

RUNGE: No. No. See, I think that was . . .

MOSS: '62?

RUNGE: Yeah, I think I was part of the staff . . .

MOSS: September '62, approximately.

RUNGE: Yeah. I was not there. That was, I think, essentially, as I understand it, a Vance-Katzenbach operation . . .

MOSS: Right. Right.

RUNGE: Cy was then secretary of the army, [Joseph A.] Joe Califano was down there with him, Nick was over at Justice.

MOSS: Right. Let me go back to something that I remember now that I've left out. You mentioned a couple of people on your staff. Going back to the early days of your administration in Manpower, how much freedom did you have to choose your subordinates, your own staff? How much was given to you, in effect, by the permanent staff already there? How much leeway did you have to build your own team?

RUNGE: Well, I didn't have very much. After all, the freedom usually comes in terms of the people you can add, not the question of displacement. I did bring in [Edward L.] Ed Katzenbach, Nick's brother, kind of on the education side and including that much abused troop information education program.

MOSS: Yeah. I'd like to talk about that in the interview.

RUNGE: Yeah, that's kind of fun. Health, you see, was brought over and made a part of Manpower.

MOSS: You also had the chaplain corps.

RUNGE: Oh, yeah. Sure. Signal success with the chaplains. It related to the Mormons.

MOSS: Oh, really?

RUNGE: It's kind of an interesting footnote. If you're interested, we can talk about it, but it's not that

important--really more amusing.

MOSS: Footnotes are.

RUNGE: The health thing was sensitive because of the external reaction from the AMA [American Medical Association]. We had . . .

MOSS: Because of the Medicare implications?

RUNGE: No, simply prestige. You see, the medical and dental associations somewhere along the line, I think, had been instrumental in creating an assistant secretary, you see for health affairs. It was Dr. [Frank B.] Berry, a distinguished and able man. But there is a congressional limit, you know, a statutory limit on how many assistant secretaries, and McNamara wanted that position. And so he rolled it into my office. Well . . .

MOSS: I always wondered where that one came from. I didn't get it.

RUNGE: Well, that's how it happened. And we had . . .

MOSS: He appointed John Rubel an assistant secretary. Perhaps that's where he got it from.

RUNGE: I think that's where the position came from. I had little or no difficulty with the medical side because I, at least, had the opportunity to use such skills as I had to keep these people in hand. And this could have been a cause celebre, but it wasn't because we kept everything quiet and kept relations smooth. And the person that really helped me with it was Dr. [William S.] Middleton who used to be dean of this medical school, who was then chief of VA [Veterans' Administration] medicine and kind of one of the medical statesmen, an old soldier. Great man. He's getting an honorary degree here next year, this next week--William Middleton. So . . .

MOSS: I'm continually amazed, throughout all the interviewing that I do, the interweaving of personal relationships that this whole blasted system is built on.

RUNGE: Built on.

MOSS: It's fantastic!

RUNGE: It makes it worth it.

MOSS: Yeah.

RUNGE: So, you see, my appreciation of medical politics is

pretty limited. Thank God Middleton was in Washington. So he was my advisor and went out of his way to keep the waves--poured oil on the seas. And Dr. Berry, who we reduced in status and kept on, was a great gentleman. And I think I did things like this for example. Dr. Berry had his own car and driver; well, I think I arranged just to keep that, you see. You didn't want to take a man of this distinction and publicly. . . . I mean it's enough to change his title, but you don't have him appear in a taxicab instead of his own car. Silly as that is, but in the Washington setting this kind of pecking order is of some significance.

And then, the other thing that I did because Dr. Berry was getting on in years and was not particularly aggressive. . . .

We always had some trouble with the deputy which we eased out. He was kind of nasty and tried to cause trouble, but we kind of cut him off at the gap. But we had a military deputy in that office. And it was, I think, time for the army to name a deputy, nominate a deputy. And they came up with some old brigadier major general--medical corps. And I looked at the record and called Leonard Heaton--great man, surgeon general of the army--and said to him, "Leonard, this man is about to retire. Don't you think that the army ought to put a guy who's on the way up in this office to support Dr. Berry?" And I said, "On the other hand, if he's more than a medical administrator, if you have a first-rate man that you want him to keep his hand in active medicine, the job isn't that difficult but what he can't spend a fair amount of time at Walter Reed [Hospital], get a little practice in." So the net result was that Heaton changed his nomination to a very distinguished, able surgeon whom we brought back from Europe to take that deputy's role. So the medical side of the thing, I think--in part because I handled it with some diplomacy--ran very well and gave us no trouble. [Interruption] And I think I would have had the option to replace him. This was probably a mistake.

As a chief deputy who had been there, [Stephen S.] Jackson, who was a lawyer and sometime judge out of New York who had come down maybe as early as Anna Rosenberg's time, and loyal, able fellow in certain areas--Steve Jackson. . . . I somehow thought, and I think this was a mistake, that an old hand was good to have around. Well, Steve was unable to react or cope with the new spirit and was of limited assistance. Not that he didn't try or that his heart wasn't in the right place, but the whole approach was really foreign to him. And I suppose that the kind of skills that he had were probably like mine. We were lawyers, essentially institutionalists, policy-oriented, accommodating-oriented, politically-oriented. He had a good feel for congressional relations and the staffs on those committees. But, you see, that wasn't under the circumstances, really what we needed. I think that we would have been better off in that office to have had a person that could have related more effectively, under the circumstances,

with the comptroller, Charlie Hitch.

MOSS: Why don't you give me your story on the Mormons just to . . .

RUNGE: Well, the Mormons. As a footnote?

MOSS: Yeah.

RUNGE: Well, Gilpatric called me one day to say that Mr. [Robert A.] Lovett had called. I pricked up my ears because I had great respect for Mr. Lovett in a variety of ways. Well, it turns out, you see, that Mr. Lovett's railroad, the Union Pacific, always has a Mormon or two of the highest order on their board of directors because, I think, the Mormons own a big block of that Union Pacific stock. And this was the Mormons' longstanding bellyache with the Defense Department, that their ministers were not commissionable in the armed forces. They had tried without success to deal with the Eisenhower administration on this. So Mr. Lovett, in his way, asked Gilpatric to use . . .

MOSS: Ezra Bensen was no help to them?

RUNGE: This is what amused me, you see?

MOSS: Yeah.

RUNGE: So I said, well, I'd be pleased to visit with their delegation. And they arrived, including this able man from Salt Lake City who was on the Union Pacific board of directors. And their local agent in Washington--this will amuse you--was Bill Marriott, that self-made man who married Senator [Reed] Smoot's daughter, you know? So we went over and over on this. And it turned out, really, that when we got all our chaplains in, that their objection to Mormons was not their religion--or if it was they wouldn't admit it--but the fact that you're trained for the ministry in the Mormon church by your apprenticeship. There is no formal seminary. And so . . .

MOSS: No real ordination.

RUNGE: That's right. You see, their complaint was that these people did not have the formal theological training that would qualify them for this distinctive kind of commission. So--to make the footnote short--after sweating a bit, of course, that they weren't pretending to raise any objection to the organization of the Mormon church and that it was really this matter of training, we entered into a treaty with the Mormons, literally, whereby we would commission those nominated by the church as being practitioners or ministers of the Mormon church provided that they had formal academic qualifications in the humanities and

the social studies roughly equivalent to that which you received in formal theology in the more structured churches. And that solved the problem. The respective chaplain corps were satisfied and the Mormons, after all, who are really pretty heavy on organized education of their own, were delighted. And so you now have Mormons commissioned in the services. And I became a friend of Mr. Marriott in the circumstances. And I think Mr. Lovett was pleased to have his Mormon director off his back about this damn Defense Department and why they couldn't recognize the worth of Mormonism.

MOSS: Very good. Let's go back to that business of internal education in the Defense Department and the troop indoctrination and what not. You have all kinds of things happening, particularly with the General [Edwin A.] Walker type situation, the same kinds of things that the CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.] "Selling of the Pentagon" recently . . .

RUNGE: Yes, and I didn't see that program.

MOSS: You didn't?

RUNGE: I didn't see it. I should have because I understand. . . . Though I understand that one of the films we turned out when I was there was one of the butts of objection, which was, The Road to the Wall.

MOSS: Yes.

RUNGE: Well, very early in the game we came hard up against this Operation Abolition affair. And as you may recall, the film was turned out by this subsidiary group, and it had the name of Fulton Lewis, Jr. or III . . .

MOSS: Fulton Lewis, III, yeah.

RUNGE: . . . as the producer and somehow done in association with the House Armed Services Committee. See, the thing is that it was more than Fulton Lewis's. It carried as a subtitle A Formal Relationship with a Committee of the House. Well, my predecessor there, [Charles C.] Finucane, late in the game when this thing first came to his attention, he and the acting general counsel found this fundamentally objectionable and didn't know in a hell of lot better terms than we did what to do with this or how to handle this hot potato and said that this film would not go out in regular distribution but would be made available "on call." I think those were the terms. Well, we suffered with this for months because: one, how did it happen?; two, what did it mean, and what precisely were we going to do in administering this language? Vance, and Califano, who was with him then in the general counsel's office, and our people

struggled with this. Eventually, of course, it was one of the elements, you see, that led to Strom Thurmond's hearings in the Senate, which. . . . Let's see, was [John C.] Stennis nominally the chairman? I think Stennis was nominally the chairman of that . . .

MOSS: Thurmond got a special subcommittee to investigate, right?

RUNGE: Yes, and Stennis, for whom I have great respect . . .

MOSS: It was a [J. William] Fulbright memo to the department also.

RUNGE: Oh, yes, yes, yes. Fulbright got into this, raising a whole series of questions and so on--the Thurmond hearings. We did a lot of work preparing for them, and I was one of the witnesses. And, of course, you had, you see, these internal problems going on because we had down there in our ranks this fellow John Broger--who's still there--who had been a darling in the Dulles period, the cold war years; we were going to fight Communism with propaganda anywhere, any time, any way. And Broger was around but kind of trimming his sails to adjust to the new group. Ed Katzenbach kind of kept Broger in reasonable hand. But God knows what was going out the side door, you see, back to the friends up on the House un-american activities committee [House Committee on Un-American Activities] and Thurmond's lackeys. And then you had some kind of cold warriors that were deep in the bowels of the services, and particularly in the navy, that I recall. And so it was difficult to know, or to feel confident, you see, that you had control of your own operation, let alone, over and above having to cope with the Congress on this business. Well, I thought we came out reasonably well on those hearings because Thurmond was not a very tough or aggressive prosecutor. This was no Joe McCarthy. And he had his staff working down there, and they would load him with questions. And he'd ask a question, you'd respond, but he didn't follow it. He'd go on to the next question, thank God. And you see, we had not only the Operation Abolition, the Fulbright memo, but we had all that newspaper situation in Europe; what was it? The Overseas Weekly?

MOSS: Yes.

RUNGE: And this was still another kettle of fish because, well, the Overseas Weekly was just ungodly, you know--a real nag; it's really a disgraceful sort of a thing. Every time you tried to move in on that you'd come up against the freedom of the press issue, in which the American press would then spring to the defense of their colleagues in the Overseas Weekly. But nonetheless you have

to face Mrs., or Senator [Margaret Chase] Smith--incidentally, who's pretty tough in her own way--objecting to this garbage that was available and distributed over there. And it was compounded by the fact that despite this disgraceful rag, they had put the finger on Walker and his equally disgraceful . . .

MOSS: Indoctrination program.

RUNGE: . . . information and indoctrination. Well, really what I tried to do was to softshoe my way through those congressional hearings as best we could and to make some sense out of our policy position. And organizationally we pulled the operations of the army, navy and air force into closer control in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]; one thing we did. Secondly, we decided that instead of putting out to the troops and then trying to defend some of this third-rate junk, that we'd better do something that was reasonably good. Now, in the passage of time, maybe it isn't so good, but we did get some money out of McNamara. We went about trying to make a couple of good films, and The Road to the Wall was one of them. We got CBS films and I think-- what's his name?

MOSS: [Walter] Cronkite narrated it, didn't he?

RUNGE: No, it wasn't Cronkite, I regret to say.

MOSS: There was one of them which Cronkite did narrate.

RUNGE: Cronkite did, yeah, but that wasn't the one. But we got [Robert] Saudek to produce it. And there's no one better than Saudek--great and able guy. And [Frank F.] Mankiewicz was the writer. CBS Films searched film libraries all over the world for the documentary stuff. As I recollect it was all documentary. We didn't fake any of that stuff, it was true. I'll admit that it was . . .

MOSS: Loaded.

RUNGE: . . . loaded, given our critics on the Hill, but at least I wanted it. . . . I mean, maybe the music and the voice and the language was tough, but at least I wanted it to relate to fact. And we did bring in some scholars and some reputable people as consultants. One of them was my colleague here, John Armstrong, who was a Columbia [University] Ph.D. in Russian Affairs. I'll admit he's pretty hard-line, but at least I wanted it to be accurate and respectable. If it was going to be criticized, it would be criticized on grounds other than inaccuracy. Well, so that this was a counterthrust. And then, McNamara was sold on this idea of having that commission chaired by the fellow from Champion Paper [and Fibre Co.]. What's his name? I saw his name in the paper. [Karl R.] Bendetsen. Karl Bendetsen. I think he'd been in the Department of State or somewhere in the

Eisenhower regime. It was a very distinguished panel that looked at this whole troop information education area and rendered a report which didn't mean a great deal, but it was an example of a kind of a distinguished citizens commission to look at an area that's in trouble and come up with some guidelines and admonitions and so forth. Well, we didn't come out too badly and probably did some good. And there were some very good people on that, people like [Alfred M.] Gruenther, the distinguished Jesuit Father Murray. If nothing else, it was simply a pleasant experience to have people of that calibre giving you some advice and counsel. They travel all around the world--you know, it was a big operation.

So fundamentally, of course, the question is whether you should indoctrinate your troops. I rather believe that this is fair game, if it's done with some circumspection. But what we tried to eliminate was the Defense Department using this machinery, which is essentially designed to deal with your own people, to get it out into the civil sector, into the civil community through the guise of reserve officers and quasi-military associated groups trying to engage in internal domestic political propaganda. And I suppose that CBS' attack, in part, is directed at this. And to that extent I think they're right. Now, we also had some internal problems there that [Arthur] Art Sylvester was kind of bound and determined that his office should take over this troop information education function. Well, we resisted that, and that's one we won. I think it would have been most unfortunate if Art had prevailed on that because as soon as you do that, drawing this line between internal activity and external activity becomes increasingly difficult. Art's operation, public affairs, is external, and should not have the internal responsibility because that really should stay with the other training and educational missions.

MOSS: Another area was, of course, pay and allowance and that sort of thing. There was a military pay raise bill pending, at least, while you were there.

RUNGE: Yes.

MOSS: And there was the question of some cutbacks, for instance, flight pay for officers who really no longer needed to fly and this kind of thing.

RUNGE: Yes. Well, my recollection is we had some success on getting that flight pay in hand. This, of course, raised the hackles of the air force and the navy. The army wasn't too much concerned because army aviation was small and fledgling operation. Let me see. Trying to remember if that flight pay thing was a legislative issue or not, I think that was essentially internal.

MOSS: I believe that it was. At any rate, I have not seen reference to legislation on it.

RUNGE: Yeah. I think it was internal. We had, of course, the whole question of pay and allowances and prerequisites. And that, I was gone, but I had some part in launching the effort to get that working group together. And we got from the air force and from Rand [Corporation] the guy who is now the director of the Urban [Land] Institute. What's his name? Blond, good-looking guy. Well, he is currently the director of the urban institute. Hitch was helpful on this, to turn up this fellow, because we simply didn't have the internal competence to even attempt that operation. Well, you could have attempted it, and conceivably, you know, it might have come out essentially at the same place. But it was important at that juncture to have someone that the comptroller was satisfied with to do this review on pay and allowances because if we hadn't, they probably would have taken it over. What was his name? Well it may occur to me.

MOSS: It can be researched very easily.

RUNGE: So that was launched. Now, the other area, which was never really resolved, but later one form or another went up to the Congress, was the study commission which really preceded us. What the hell was the name of that? It was named for the chairman who, I think, had been an admiral in the navy, really, a personnel policy legislation. Does your workup remind you of the name?

MOSS: No, it doesn't; it doesn't have it.

RUNGE: And it was probably, by the time it eventually got down there for legislation, carried a different designation. But the most difficult part of that was the numbers: the question of how many flag rank and general officers there were to be in the respective services; what the tests and criteria were for the allocations. And, you see, this is an area, you see, that runs to the very guts of the respective services. And McNamara was impatient that that wasn't turned out in shorter order and perhaps with some justification. But I worked long and hard with the chiefs of personnel in the respective services to work out these relations and the formula. And as I recall, the result, you see, that where we were coming out was the navy was, in fact, to get more. And I think the air force stayed about the same as to where they were. Then there's the army, that was losing, at that juncture, general officers vis a vis the navy. And my recollection was that it was justified, that the army was in the position to put general officers and really when you tested it to be. . . . When they went into joint positions or positions that turned over, the navy would typically nominate a captain where the army was in a position to put a brigadier general. But the thing was out of balance and was out of balance because it was tied to statutory

provisions and numbers. And in turn, you see, this question of flag ranks and how this was adjusted was near and dear to the heart of the House Armed Services Committee and [John R.] Blandford and his staff. So to me this was an area which required a kind of patient, long term, careful negotiation with the services and with the congressional staffs, on its own merits, and because of a consuming interest that the services had in this sensitive area and the congressional staffs.

MOSS: Let me ask you a final question here--I hope I don't run out of tape before you get your answer on--and that is the whole business of, really, the strategic guts of your area: What should our force levels be? And if I understand correctly from our conversation in the car coming over, it was difficult to get a good handle on this simply because our intelligence of the Russian and Chinese, for instance, force levels was inadequate to provide a comparative basis. Is this fair, and how much more to it is there?

RUNGE: Well, this, of course, is part of it. But, of course, even before that comes the question as to what do you need to carry out your strategic policies? I'm not sure precisely where this responsibility now lies. I would rather guess that it was taken out of the Manpower secretariat and put into somewhere in the comptroller's office to work up levels. And this, in fact, may be the appropriate place for it because it relates so closely, you see, to the whole analysis and resolution of force that should be available under varying circumstances.

MOSS: Which includes other things just than numbers of people.

RUNGE: That's right. It may be most appropriate that the determination of the operational units required to meet certain contingency plans is not properly in this office. The goals having been set, the question of how many you need to maintain those force levels is proper within the manpower secretariat, when you're looking at turnover, length of service--which is the retention question--the training cycle, and all of the factors back of eventually putting that number of people on the line. But we did, you see, because we were faced with the proposition that the mix of forces was improper. I did get involved in that, and particularly with the army staff because they were under the gun. Then, one thing I managed to pull off, on the plus side by my lights, was a little alliance with John Connally, then secretary of the navy, to beef up the number of people overall in the navy all to the end that--at the end of the line--the staffing level in the fleet was greater, or, you know, came closer to the wartime manning levels. I was concerned that we had the fleet at sea with the manning level so low--except on new ships--that they really couldn't go to general quarters

and sustain it. And I thought it was really disgraceful to ask a captain to take a ship to sea. And as long as you're, you know, cruising around in the Mediterranean in the sunshine and nothing happens, this is well and good. But having put the ship out there, it had to have an adequate manning level. And we did manage to get some improvements there. Of course, Connally was quite an ally. This is a tough, smart, hard-bargaining man who chafed under the McNamara regime.

MOSS: Yes, I can imagine.

RUNGE: Stahr chafed under it but didn't have either the opportunity to move fast enough or with enough political clout, you see.

MOSS: To use it, yeah.

RUNGE: To use it. And Stahr and I were good friends, and we still are, and in some respects, kind of the same kind of orientation and background. [Eugene M.]

Zuckert was more attuned to McNamara's style and was really a weapons man, and more background in material and systems and all the rest of it. And, of course, we were building strength at that time, you see. So while there was some question, generally on the total manpower question, you see, we were going up. Now, I suppose--and this feeds back to this reserve thing, you see--when we used these reserve forces during the Berlin affair this was just god-awful. We weren't ready to do it, particularly the army. The National Guard units were reasonably ready and that was easier. But--the question of reserve fillers--who should go? Who shouldn't go? Who in fact was on the rolls, you know? They were in just god-awful shape. I remember asking Stahr--I asked the army before this happened--to give me some kind of appreciation: Were they ready? You see? Well, the answer was like--Elvis didn't know any better than I did, obviously--the French statement in 1870 about being ready down to the last shoelace. And that was about the level at which we were ready. It was a god-awful mess.

The net result of that whole affair was to bring great discredit, it seemed to me, on the units. And that isn't where the discredit should have been placed. The discredit was on the management, the regular army's management, that reserve pool which was designed to drag in everyone, you see, for a general mobilization. Well, if you drag in everyone these nice gradations aren't very significant. And McNamara got a real bellyful and, of course, to him it just supported all of his prejudices on these National Guard units. And it was particularly embarrassing because the greatest hell was raised about my own. See, we brought the Wisconsin National guard to duty. I didn't select them, but I knew they were going to be selected because they stood first in the army's pecking order--didn't help me at home either. Here I am sitting with a goddamn flag, and so, you know, "Bring your

troops to duty." Well, there was nothing wrong with the unit except, unfortunately, our sophisticated commander had retired three months before. And the commander was not of the best; good, fine infantryman, but the pace and the politics were too fast for him. But this is a point that I think might have some merit some years from now. Thirty-second Division was sent to Fort Lewis. The army, as you know, and the services no longer just issue things in kind; you're given an allowance and you draw against the money allowance. The division arrived at Fort Lewis before the Congress had given us--what's the term we used?--sums sufficient to the Department of Defense; sums sufficient hadn't been given to the army. And in turn the army couldn't give it to Sixth Army in San Francisco, nor in turn to Fort Lewis.

BEGIN TAPE II SIDE II

RUNGE: So though equipment was on the shelves or in the warehouse, the Wisconsin National Guard didn't have the cash credits established to draw on it.

MOSS: Where was the block?

RUNGE: Because the comptroller at OSD had said, "We will release to the army adequate sums when you come forward with your justified plans."

MOSS: Okay.

RUNGE: The troops moved before the plan had been justified, and there was the problem. Net result: Sergeant so-and-so writes home and says, "I had to go out and buy a light bulb." Well, that sergeant's old man isn't afraid to pick up the phone and talk to his congressman. And this hue and cry and hell-raising which was kind of a mini, national disgrace represented something that except for the embarrassment and the annoyance and the unfavorable publicity was kind of healthy to me. It's the fact that the American people do talk back when there is maladministration. And this just infuriated the high command in the Pentagon and was, you see, used to demonstrate that these really are unreliable politically oriented people.

Well, I submit that when the reaction came to Vietnam, it came--well, number one, we avoided the use of reserve troops because we were afraid of a political reaction, I think--in '67 and '68, when we had run through the regular army and were starting to draft the sons of people who talk back. And my own hunch is that if we can't maintain a security policy in which we can use people who are prepared to talk back, there's something wrong and questionable about the policy if this makes any . . .

MOSS: There is a string of logic in it. Yes, I can see that.

RUNGE: A logic in this. This is why I'm very troubled, you see, to the response to this kind of situation in which you say, "We aren't going to draft people. We really aren't going to pay much attention to this reserve establishment. We're going to buy them. This is a volunteer force because when you buy them, they'll suffer most any indignity, maladministration, ill conceived policy, because they're ours." And I cannot understand the logic of the professional liberals who, in order to satisfy their constituency--like my friend Kastenmeier here--are committed to a voluntary army. Well, what they're saying is, "If you must have this military business, don't touch us." In other words, "you can take the poor and you can take the Blacks and the ignorant, but don't touch us." But what they don't understand is the political dynamite in this if in twenty-five years the only veterans--the people with the number one claim on patriotism in political terms--are no longer the sons of the middle class, or no longer include the sons of the middle class but, in fact, are the poor and the ignorant and the disadvantaged. This to me is an example of what I was trying to talk about earlier in understanding, in American historical perspective, the role of the military in our society.

MOSS: Right. Very good. Let me ask you, just to round this out, if you would talk about the circumstances of your leaving the department.

RUNGE: Well, there were a series of issues. In reserve-National Guard Berlin callup affair McNamara was unhappy, either because of simply what happened or because he thought some of this might have been foreseen that wasn't foreseen. And I think that he felt that I was operating on the side. I wasn't really; I was kind of open about it. I was trying to maintain working relations with the congressional committees. I went to New Orleans with [F. Edward] Hebert and all of that because by my approach to things was this was a working relationship between those committees and the department. I think he was unhappy about the fact that this particular secretariat--though as I suggested earlier all the new positions were put somewhere else--was not able to respond effectively to his managerial techniques, comptroller's office. And I was troubled almost from the beginning about his kind of mind-set and his failure to appreciate the somewhat bigger political picture that I thought that the first minister of the national security effort really had to be attuned, or should be attuned, to the political relationships if he were to serve the president adequately.

So I found, or was annoyed and troubled by this approach. Despite his claim to objectivity, my own belief was that his mind was made up and the question was then to justify his conclusion. And he in turn, I think, was unhappy with the ability of this office to respond in appropriate terms to his

managerial method. So it was not a happy relationship. And I, in effect, got the word through Gilpatric, and I read the word and decided that I had no obviously political status with the president himself or with [Robert F. Kennedy] Bobby. McNamara was most adequately wired to Bobby Kennedy. That meant I better get the hell out of there, and I did. I mean, that's about what it amounts to. I suppose that Stahr and I were in about the same bag except that he was fortunate enough to have that presidency at the University of Indiana which I didn't have. I must say that I spent eight or nine years really under the shadow of this, because McNamara was the darling of the academic liberal community.

I think that in part my concerns about McNamara--and I'm willing to admit my inadequacies, given his managerial method--have been borne out. I think that he moved very quickly after the president's assassination to make himself indispensable to Mr. [Lyndon B.] Johnson, who didn't have, I'm afraid the personal psychological--well, status isn't the right word. He somehow felt, first of all, and then I understand this until his own election, dependent, politically, that he had to keep the Kennedy group around him. I think he would have been well advised to have his own type of man. And I think if Clark Clifford had been on the scene three years earlier, he and we would have been better off. This intellectual arrogance of Bob McNamara and his deficiencies in the political realm led him and in turn led the president into decisions which I'm sure were, God knows, analyzed in the most elegant quantitative method, which did not take account of some of these fuzzy issues like the staying power, the political resiliency of oriental Communism. It's a question of political intelligence and it's weight. Now, if the intelligence is bad, doesn't make any difference how you weigh it, but if it's good, if you weigh it, if you don't give it the proper weight you're into trouble.

And I just know, number one, that this venture in Southeast Asia was politically consistent with our post-war policy. My concern, principal concern, has been that it was ill-conceived militarily, and proven by the fact that it hasn't worked worth a damn. Do you suppose that they went into Lyndon Johnson and said that thirty billion a year and five hundred thousand men on the ground, that in five or six years we can get a kind of an uneasy standoff? Well, I submit that I don't know what they told him. I venture they told him that a three division rounded out force of air and naval support in eighteen months would bring these people to terms. And when it didn't work, we couldn't admit; we kept pouring more and more and more in justifying this. And I must say--without being vindictive--it became very much the product of Mr. McNamara and his immediate staff. The Joint Chiefs [of Staff] had been tailored to satisfy Mr. McNamara. And as [David] Halberstam suggests, when you get yes men, they say yes to anything. You know, right or wrong, you didn't have the [General Curtis E.] LeMays and the [General David M.] Shoups on the scene. He brought Max Taylor . . .

